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ARTICLES & COMMENTS
THE CORPORATE CONTRACT
Frank H. Easterbrook* and Daniel R. Fischel**
INTRODUCTION'

For a long time public and academic discussion of corporations has
started from the premise that managers have "control" and use this to
exploit investors, customers, or both. The usual prescription is some
form of public control. This may take the form of regulation of the
firm's output and prices. It may take the form of regulation of the securities markets. It may take the form of intervention through corporate law, which establishes minimum voting rules and restricts how
managers can treat the firm and the investors.
The argument is simple. In most substantial corporations-firms
with investment instruments freely traded, which we call public corporations-each investor has a small stake compared with the size of the
venture. The investor is therefore "powerless." The managers, on the
other hand, know how the business is running and can conceal from
investors information about the firm and their own activities. As a result the managers can divert income to themselves, stealing and mismanaging at the same time. Diversion and sloth may be subtle, but
they exist. Even when they do not, the potential for misconduct remains. Only some form of regulation can protect investors. And the
limit on regulation is to be found not in principles of free contractingfor the corporate charter is at best a contract of adhesion by which the
managers call all the shots-but in a concern that regulation not go
"too far." Thus, in the debate about whether public corporations
should be permitted to issue nonvoting stock, most people assume that
nonvoting stock is bad because it insulates the managers further from
investors' control, and the only question is whether an outright ban (as
opposed to severe regulations) would restrict "too much" the ability of
firms to raise capital.
Yet, although the language of regulation is everywhere, corporate
• Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago.
** Lee and Brena Freeman Professor of Law, The Law School, and Professor of
Law and Business, The Graduate School of Business, The University of Chicago.
1. A revised version of this essay will appear as Chapter I in F. Easterbrook & D.
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (forthcoming Harvard University
Press 1990). In writing both the book and this Article, we have adapted some of our
published work. The opening pages of Part I come from Easterbrook, Managers'
Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540,
544-47 (1984).
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law has developed along a different path. The corporate code in almost
every state is an "enabling" statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator and without
effective restraint on the permissible methods of corporate governance.
The handiwork of managers is final in all but exceptional or trivial instances. Courts apply the "business judgment doctrine," a hands-off
approach that they would never apply to the decisions of administrative
agencies or other entities-the officials of which do not stand to profit
from their decisions, and therefore, one might think, are not subject to
the pressures that cause managers' goals to diverge from those of
investors.
Consider the domain of choice. The founders and managers of a
firm choose whether to organize as a corporation, trust, partnership,
mutual or cooperative. They choose what the firm will make or do and
whether it will operate for profit, not for profit, or hold a middle
ground, pursuing profit but not to the exclusion of some other objective (as publishers of newspapers do). They choose whether to allow
the public to invest or whether, instead, the firm will be closely held.
They choose what kinds of claims (debt, equity, warrants) to issue, in
what ratios, for what price, with what entitlements, including not only
the right to receive payments (how often, in what amounts), but also
whether these investments allow their holders to vote-and if to vote,
how many votes, and on what subjects. They choose where to incorporate. They choose how the firm will be organized (as a pyramidal hierarchy or as a loose, multi-divisional collective), whether central
leadership will be strong or weak, and whether the firm grows (internally or by merger) or shrinks (sells existing assets or spins off divisions). Investors select the members of the board of directors, who
may be "inside" or "outside," and the board decides who exercises
which powers on the firm's behalf. As a practical matter boards are
self-perpetuating until investors become dissatisfied and a majority decides to redo everything to a new taste. With trivial exceptions, all
business decisions-including the managers' pay, bonuses, stock options, pensions, and perquisites-are taken by or under the supervision
of this board, with no substantial inquiry by anyone else. Anyone who
asks a court to inquire will be brushed off with a reference to the business judgment rule.
Some things are off-limits. States almost uniformly forbid perpetual directorships; they set quorum rules, which typically require a third
of the board and sometimes half of the investors to participate on critical decisions; they require "major" transactions to be presented to the
board (occasionally shareholders too) rather than stand approved by
managers or a committee; they forbid the sale of votes divorced from
the investment interest and the accumulation of votes in a corporate
treasury; they require managers to live up to a duty of loyalty to invesHeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1417 1989
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tors. Federal law requires firms to reveal certain things when they issue
securities, and public firms must make annual disclosures. Determined
investors and managers can get 'round many of these rules, but accommodation is a sidelight. Any theory of corporate law must account for
the mandatory as well as the enabling features of the law, and must
account for the pattern of regulation-one that leaves managers effectively free to set their own salaries yet forbids them to delegate certain
questions to subcommittees, that gives shareholders no entitlement to
dividends or distributions of any kind but specifies a quorum of onethird of the board for certain decisions. We attend to that task later on.
For now, though, it is enough to say that what is open to free choice is
far more important to the daily operation of the firm, and investors'
welfare, than is what the law prescribes. For debt investors and employees, everything (literally) is open to contract; for equity investors,
almost everything is open to choice.
Why does corporate law allow managers to set the terms under
which they will govern corporate assets? Why do courts grant more
discretion to self-interested managers than to disinterested regulators?
Why do investors entrust such stupendous sums to managers whose
acts are essentially unconstrained by legal rules? The answers lie in,
and help explain, the economic structure of corporate law. The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate
law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the
many different sets of risks and opportunities that are available in a
large economy. No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the "enabling" structure of corporate law.
Although managers are self-interested, this interest can be aligned
with that of investors through automatic devices, devices that are useless when those in control are "disinterested"; hence the apparent contradiction that self-interested managers have more freedom than
disinterested regulators. Of course controls are not free, and much of
corporate law is designed to reduce the costs of aligning the interests of
managers and investors. Before we explore the nature of the legal
rules, however, we develop the framework within which all of our analysis proceeds: the corporate structure is a set of contracts through
which managers and certain other participants exercise a great deal of
discretion that is "reviewed" by interactions with other self-interested
actors. This interaction often occurs in markets, and we shall sometimes call the pressures these interactions produce "market forces."
No one should assume from this shorthand, however, that we personify
,'markets." All economic activity is an interaction among real people,
and the interactions that shape the corporate form are among the most
interesting.
I.

THE DYNAMICS SHAPING THE CORPORATE FORM

The view one takes of corporations and corporate law is apt to deHeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1418 1989
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pend on one's assumptions about how investors, employees, and other
players come to be associated in a venture. Those who assume that
corporations are born with a complement of managers, employees, and
investors are more likely to be driven to a regulatory view of corporations. Suppose the world is static. Everyone awakes one morning to
find himself a manager or an investor. The veil of ignorance is suddenly parted. The manager exalts: "Aha! No one can stop me!" The
investors gasp: "Woe is me, I'm powerless." This is the natural view of
one who draws a line at a moment in time without asking how the world
came to be as it is.
Managers and investors do not wake up in this way. They assume
their roles with knowledge of the consequences. Investors part with
their money willingly, putting dollars in equities instead of bonds or
banks or land or gold because they believe the returns of equities more
attractive. Managers obtain their positions after much trouble and toil,
competing against others who wanted them. All interested persons
participate. Firms are born small and grow. They must attract customers and investors by promising and delivering what those people value.
Corporations that do not do so will not survive. When people observe
that firms are very large in relation to single investors, they observe the
product of success in satisfying investors and customers.
How is it that managers came to control such resources? 2 It is not
exactly secret that scattered shareholders can't control managers directly. If the investors know that the managers have lots of discretion,
why did they give their money to these managers in the first place? If
managers promise to return but a pittance, the investors will not put up
very much money. The investors simply pay less for the paper the firms
issue. There is therefore a limit on managers' efforts to enrich themselves at investors' expense. Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market
drive them to act as if they had investors' interests at heart. It is almost
as if there were an invisible hand.
The corporation and its securities are products to as great an ex2. The discussion that follows owes much to Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the

Firm:. Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305
(1976). They and we write in a tradition that began with Coase, The Nature of the Firm,

4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937). Other important contributions include Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ.
Rev. 777 (1972); Fama &Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J.L. & Econ.

327 (1983); Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J.L. &Econ. 301
(1983); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 10
(1965); Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1427
(1964); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977); see also Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business
(J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); N. Wolfson, The Modern Corporation: Free Markets vs. Regulation (1984); Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4J.L. Econ. & Organiza-

tion 267 (1988).
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tent as the sewing machines or other things the firm makes. Just as the
founders of a firm have incentives to make the kinds of sewing machines people want to buy, they have incentives to create the kind of
firm, governance structure, and securities people value. The founders
of the firm will find it profitable to establish the governance structure
that is most beneficial to investors, net of the costs of maintaining the
structure. People who seek resources to control will have to deliver
more returns to investors. Those who promise the highest returnsand make the promises binding, hence believable-will obtain the largest investments.
The first question facing entrepreneurs is what promises to make,
and the second is how to induce investors to believe the promises.
Empty promises are worthless promises. Answering the first question
depends on finding ways to reduce the effects of divergent interests;
answering the second depends on finding legal and automatic enforcement devices. The more automatic the enforcement, the more investors will believe the promises.
What promises will the entrepreneurs make in order to induce investors to hand over more money? No set of promises is right for all
firms at all times. No one thinks that the governance structure used for
a small business will work well for Exxon or Hydro Quebec. The best
structure cannot be derived from theory; it must be developed by experience. We should be skeptical of claims that any one structure-or
even a class of structures-is best. But we can see the sorts of promises
that are likely to emerge in the competition for investments.
Some promises entail submitting to scrutiny in advance of action.
Outside directors watch inside ones; inside directors watch other managers; the managers hire detectives to watch the employees. At other
times, though, prior monitoring may be too costly in relation to its benefits, and the most desirable methods of control will rest on deterrence,
on letting people act as they wish but penalizing certain conduct. Fiduciary obligations and litigation are forms of subsequent settling-up included among these kinds of devices. Still other methods operate
automatically. Managers enjoy hefty salaries and perquisites of office;
the threat of losing these induces managers to act in investors' interest.
Managers in the United States must select the place of incorporation. The fifty states offer different menus of devices (from voting by
shareholders to fiduciary rules to derivative litigation) for the protection of investors. The managers who pick the state of incorporation
that is most desirable from the perspective of investors will attract the
most money. The states that select the best combination of rules will
attract the most corporate investment (and therefore increase their tax
collections). So states compete to offer-and managers to use-beneficial sets of legal rules. These include not only rules about governance
structures but also fiduciary rules and prohibitions of fraud.
Managers select when to go public. Less experienced entrepreHeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1420 1989
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neurs start with venture capital, which comes with extensive strings.
The venture capitalists control the operation of the firm with some
care. Only after the managerial team and structure have matured will
the firm issue public securities.
Entrepreneurs make promises in the articles of incorporation and
the securities they issue when they go public. The debt investors receive exceptionally detailed promises in indentures. These promises
concern the riskiness of the firm's operations, the extent to which earnings may be paid out, and the domain of managerial discretion. These
promises benefit equity investors as well as debt investors. The equity
investors usually receive votes rather than explicit promises. Votes
make it possible for the investors to replace the managers. (Those who
believe that managers have unchecked control should ask themselves
why the organizers of a firm issue equity claims that enable the investors to replace the managers.) The managers also promise, explicitly or
otherwise, to abide by the standards of "fair dealing" embedded in the
fiduciary rules of corporate law. Sometimes they make additional
promises as well.
To sum up: self-interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like
other investors, are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize
net profits. If they do not, they pay in lower prices for corporate paper.
Any one firm may deviate from the optimal measures. Over tens of
years and thousands of firms, though, tendencies emerge. The firms
and managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative to others. Because the choices do not generally impose costs on
strangers to the contracts, what is optimal for the firms and investors is
optimal for society. We can learn a great deal just by observing which
devices are widely used and which are not.
It ig important to distinguish between isolated transactions and
governance structures. There are high costs of operating capital and
managerial markets, just as there are high costs of other methods of
dealing with the divergence of interests. It is inevitable that a substantial amount of undesirable slack or self-dealing will occur. The question is whether these costs can be cut by mechanisms that are not
themselves more costly. We accept some costly conduct because the
costs of the remedy are even greater. We also use deterrence (say, the
threat of punishment for fraud) rather than other forms of legal control
when deterrence is the least-cost method of handling a problem. Deterrence is a particularly inexpensive method. The expensive legal system is not cranked up unless there is evidence of wrongdoing; if the
anticipated penalty (the sanction multiplied by the probability of its application) is selected well, there will not be much wrongdoing, and the
costs of the system are correspondingly small. A regulatory system
(one entailing scrutiny and approval in advance in each case) ensures
that the costs of control will be high; they will be incurred even if the
risk is small.
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1421 1989
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Markets that let particular episodes of wrongdoing slide by, or
legal systems that use deterrence rather than structural change to handle the costs of management, are likely very effective in making judgments about optimal governance structures. Governance structures are
open and notorious, unlike the conduct they seek to control. Costs of
information in knowing about a firm's governance are low. Firms and
teams of managers can compete with each other over time to design
governance structures and to build in penalties for malfeasance. There
is no substantial impediment to the operation of the competitive process at the level of structure. The pressures that operate in the long
run are exactly the forces that shape structure.3 Contractual promises
and fiduciary rules arise as a result of these considerations.
One of us has considered elsewhere whether this picture is plausible or just wishful thinking.4 Today's task is to step back and ask
whether corporation-as-contract is a satisfying way of looking at things
even in theory. No one portrays the relation between trustee and beneficiary as one of arm's-length contracting, and legal rules impose many
restrictions that the trustee cannot avoid. Why think about corporations differently?
II. MARKETS, FIRMS, AND CORPORATIONS

A. Firms
"Markets" are economic interactions among people dealing as
strangers and seeking advantage. The extended conflict among selfish
people produces prices that allocate resources to their most valuable
uses. 5 A series of short-term dealings in a market may be more useful
for trading than for producing goods, however. The firm-an aggregation of people banded together for a longer period-permits greater
use of specialization. People can organize as teams with the functions
of each member identified, so that each member's specialization makes
the team as a whole more productive than it would otherwise be.
Teams could be assembled every day, the way casual labor is hired.
Some production is organized in this way. The construction and longshore industries assemble separate teams for each project. More often,
however, the value of a long-term relation among team members predominates, and to the extent it does recognizable firms grow. Yet as
the size of the firm grows, there must be more and more transactions
3. Our treatment has much in common with R. Nelson & S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), even though it is an application of neoclassical
analysis that Nelson and Winter challenge. Survivorship stories have been used in economics for a long time. The more sophisticated and rapid the process of natural seleclion, the better these analyses work. Firms are a paradigm for evolutionary pressure in
c'onomic organization.

4. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 547-53.
5. This is an old story, and Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) remains
the hest exposition.
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1422 1989
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among members. A manufacturer of cars that makes its own paint must
decide how much paint to use, and of what quality. Does it make sense
to add extra paint, or to make the paint job a little less durable? This
depends on the value of the paint the firm uses-and on whether someone else could provide the paint for less. The integrated firm has difficulty assessing the value of the paint it makes for itself, however. It
must take expensive steps to give the paint a value (called a "transfer
price"), which at best duplicates information that markets produce and
at worst may be quite inaccurate, leading the firm to make inefficient
decisions. Managers may specify transfer prices that, if inaccurate, will
lead firms to produce paint they should have bought, or to use too
much or too little paint in their products. Transacting for paint in markets has risks (will the seller deliver on time? will the quality be good?)
that are costly to deal with. Letters of credit, the courts, organized exchanges and credit bureaus are among the costs of markets. Transacting for paint inside the firm is costly too. The firm grows until the costs
of organizing production internally exceed the costs of organizing
things through market transactions.
One cost of cooperative production inside the firm is the divergence of interest among the participants. It is sometimes useful to
think of the atoms dealing in markets as individual people who reap the
gains and bear the expenses of their own decisions. The organization
of production in teams is not so simple. The firm may hire labor by the
hour ("hourly employees") or the year ("salaried employees"); this arrangement hires a segment of time but not a specified effort. It may be
very difficult to induce the employee to devote his best effort to the
firm's fortunes. Why should he? His pay is the same no matter his
performance. Although it may be possible to penalize sluggards by reducing their wages or firing them (a process sometimes called "ex post
settling up"), it is costly to monitor effort (and who monitors the
monitors' efforts?). On top of that, often it is very difficult to determine
the quality of the work performed. Designers may put together an excellent airplane (the Lockheed L-10 11 comes to mind) that fails in the
market either for reasons beyond their control or because it was "too
good" and so too costly. A system of monitoring that asked only
whether the employees' work is profitable for the firm would lead to
very inaccurate rewards when there are risks beyond the control of the
employees or knowledge beyond the reach of the monitors. 6 Unless
someone knows the quality of each person's work in relation to the demand, settling up must be imperfect; and given that accounts may be
settled well after the work has been performed, the time value of money
sometimes will make a balancing of accounts impossible.
6. There is an extensive economic literature on the design of optimal systems of
rewards for work under conditions of risk and incomplete (or asymmetric) knowledge.

We need not explore this flourishing field because the proposition that monitoring is
costly, imprecise, or both holds under any system of rewards yet designed.
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1423 1989
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Another way around the difficulty of monitoring the work of the
firm's employees is to give each the right to claim the profits from the
firm's success. Then he will work hard and monitor the work of his
colleagues, lest their -sub-par performance reduce his rewards. But the
allocation of the venture's profits to the employees-and by employees
we mean managers too-is just another cost. It reduces the return to
those who contribute the venture's capital. And it too is imperfect.
Much production is performed in teams. Teams of employees sweep
the floor, teams of engineers design new products, teams of managers
decide whether and where to build new plants. So long as no monitor
can determine what each member's marginal contribution to the team's
output is, each member will be a less than perfect representative of the
interests of the team as a whole. Unless one person receives all the
rewards of success and penalties of failure, his incentives are not properly aligned with those of the venture as a whole. 7 "Let George do it"
is a predictable response when any given employee gets some of the
benefits of George's hard work and does not get all of the benefits of
his own hard work.
Sometimes this division of interests will lead the employee to divert the firm's assets to himself. Theft is the dramatic way to do this;
diversion of "corporate opportunities" may be another. In general the
discretion managers possess gives them an opportunity to favor themselves in dealing with the other actors. Sometimes this division of interests will lead to less diligent work. The employee may engage in
goldbricking, and the upper manager may "slack off" by working seventy hours per week rather than the seventy-five he would work if he
received more of the reward from his effort. Sometimes the division of
interests dulls the willingness to take risks. The quiet life may be a
perquisite of employment. All of these are costs. Monitoring by outsiders to reduce these costs also is costly.
Employees may reduce the amount of monitoring that is necessary
by giving "bonds"-not physical certificates but automatic devices that
impose penalties for a shortfall in performance. When managers hold
the stock of their firm, they are "bonding" their performance (in part)
by exposing their wealth to erosion if their performance, and hence the
firm's profits, is substandard. Every firm uses a different mix of bonding devices, monitoring devices, and residual costs of the divergence of
interest. The trick is to hold the total costs of these things as low as
possible. It is foolish to spend two dollars in monitoring to reduce by
one dollar the perquisites of employees. The combination of monitoring, bonding, and residual costs is called "agency costs."
7. For a discussion of the difficulties that follow when it is not possible to assign the
whole profit stream to one person, see Grossman & Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986).
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B. Corporations
So far we have been describing the firm as an extra-market, team
method of production with certain benefits and costs. Corporations are
a subset of firms. The corporation is a financing device and is not
otherwise distinctive. A corporation is characterized by a statement of
capital contributions as formal claims against the firm's income that are
distinct from participation in the firm's productive activities. The corporation issues "stock" in exchange for an investment; stock need not
be held by the firm's employees. Investors bear the risk of failure
(sometimes we call them "riskbearers") and receive the marginal rewards of success. Equity investors are paid last, after debt investors,
employees, and other investors with (relatively) "fixed" claims. These
equity investors have the "residual" claim in the sense that they get
only what is left over-but they get all of what is left over.
The separation of riskbearing from employment is a form of the
division of labor. Those who have wealth can employ it productively
even if they are not good managers; those who can manage but lack
wealth can hire capital in the market; and the existence of claims that
can be traded separately from employment allows investors to diversify
their investment interests. Diversification makes investment as a whole
less risky, in ways to which we return, and therefore makes investment
both more attractive and more efficient. Investors bear most of the risk
of business failure, in exchange for which they are promised most of
the rewards of success. The penalty for this arrangement is that separation of management and riskbearing at least potentially increases
agency costs by driving a wedge between employees' interests and
those of the venture as a whole. Employees will receive less of the return. Investors, on the other hand, will be less effective monitors to the
extent holdings are widely scattered, for then no one investor has a
good reason to monitor. (In other words, investors face their own
agency costs that dissuade them from monitoring, which is why investors in public firms often are ignorant and passive.) The corporation
will flourish when the gains from the division of labor exceed the augmentation of the agency costs.
Sometimes it is said that the distinctive features of the corporation
are limited liability, legal identity, and perpetual existence, but these
are misleading descriptions.8 "Limited liability" means only that those
who contribute equity capital to a firm risk no more than their initial
investments-it is an attribute of the investment rather than of "the
corporation." This attribute of investors' risk is related to the benefits
of widely held, liquid investment instruments. It often is altered by
8. See R. Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation 15-22, 40-42 (1979). See generally Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 577-605
(1986) (tracing the history of limited liability).
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1425 1989
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contract when these benefits are small. 9 Legal identity and perpetual
existence mean only that the corporation lasts until dissolved and has a
name in which it may 'transact arid be sued. It is convenient to think of
the firm as, an "it." Many other firms, such as business trusts, are
treated in the same way. It would be silly to attach a list of every one of
Exxon's investors to an order for office furniture just to ensure that all
investors share their percentage of the cost.
The "personhood" of a corporation is a matter of convenience
rather than reality, however; we also treat the executor of an estate as a
legal entity without submerging the fact that the executor is a stand-in
for other people. It is meaningful to speak of the legislative branch of
the United States government, or of Congress, or of Members of Congress, depending on context, but it would be misleading to think of
Congress-an entity with a name-only as an entity, or to believe that
its status as an entity is the most significant thing about the institution.
"Congress" is a collective noun for a certain group of independent
political actors and their employees, and it acts as an entity only when
certain forms have been followed. So too with corporations. They are
disparate independent actors, from production employees to managers
to equity investors to debt investors to holders of warranty and tort
claims against the firm.
C. Corporate Contracts
The arrangements among the actors constituting the corporation
usually depend on contracts and on positive law, not on corporate law
or the status of the corporation as an entity. More often than not a
reference to the corporation as an entity will hide the essence of the
transaction. So we often speak, followingJensen and Meckling,10 of the
corporation as a "nexus of contracts" or a set of implicit and explicit
contracts. This reference, too, is just a shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the
corporation will work out among themselves. The form of reference is
a reminder that the corporation is a voluntary adventure, and that we
must always examine the terms on which real people have agreed to
participate.
The agreements that have arisen are wonderfully diverse, matching
the diversity of economic activity that is carried on within corporations.
Managers sometimes hold a great deal of the firm's stock and are rewarded for success through appreciation of the prices of their investments; other employees may be paid on a piece-work basis; sometimes
compensation is via salary and bonuses. Corporations sometimes are
organized as hierarchies, with the higher parts of the pyramid issuing
9. For a discussion of limited liability, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability
and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985).
10. Jensen-& Meckling, stipra note 3, at 311.
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commands; sometimes they are organized as dictatorships; sometimes
they are organized as divisional profit centers with loose or missing hierarchy. The choice of organization and compensation devices will depend on the size of the firm, the identity of the managers, and the
industry (or spectrum of industries) in which the corporation participates. Organization and compensation in an investment bank are vastly
different from organization and compensation in an industrial conglomerate, as industrial firms that have acquired investment banks have
learned to their sorrow.
The organization of finance and control is equally variable. Small,
close corporations may have only banks as outside investors, and these
banks hold "debt" claims that carry residual rights to control the firm;
highly leveraged public firms may concentrate equity investments in
managers while issuing tradable debt claims to the public. The public
investors in these firms have no effective control, because debt conventionally does not carry voting rights. Public utilities and national banks
may have more traded equity but still no effective shareholders' control, given both regulatory structures and the nature of the risks in the
business. Many growing firms have almost no debt investment, and the
equity investment pays no dividends; these firms are under the dictatorial control of the entrepreneur."I Mature firms may be more bureaucratic, with boards of directors "independent" of managers and
answerable to equity investors. Some managerial teams attempt to insulate themselves from investors' control in order to carry out programs that they view as more important than profits. Both the New York
Times and the Wall StreetJournalhave established structures that give the
managers substantial freedom to produce news at the (potential) expense of profit.
The way in which corporations run the business, control agency
costs, raise money, and reward investors will change from business to
business and from time to time within a firm. The structure suited to a
dynamic, growing firm such as Xerox in 1965 is quite unsuited to
Exxon in 1965 (or to Xerox in 1989). The participants in the Venture
need to be able to establish the arrangement most conducive to prosperity, and outsiders are unlikely to be able to prescribe a mold for
corporations as a whole or even a firm through time. The history of
corporations has been that firms failing to adapt their governance
structures are ground under by competition.' 2 The history of corporate law has been that states attempting to force all firms into a single
mold are ground under as well. Corporations flee to find more open11. Some firms go public under rules that stifle any attempt at control; Ford, for

example, issued nonvoting stock, leaving the firm in family hands for a long time.
12. See 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 273-97 (1985); cf.

A. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(1977).
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ended statutes that permit adaptations. This is the reason for the drive
toward enabling laws that control process but not structure.
To say that a complex relation among many voluntary participants
is adaptive is to say that it is contractual. Thus our reference to the
corporation as a set of contracts. Voluntary arrangements are contracts. Some may be negotiated over a bargaining table. Some may be
a set of terms that are dictated by managers or investors and accepted
or not; only the price is negotiated. Some may be fixed and must be
accepted at the "going price" (as when people buy investment instruments traded in the market). Some may be implied by courts or legislatures trying to supply the terms that would have been negotiated had
people addressed the problem explicitly. Even terms that are invariant-such as the requirement that the board of directors act only by a
majority of a quorum-are contractual to the extent that they produce
offsetting voluntary arrangements. The result of all of these voluntary
arrangements will be contractual.
Just as there is no right amount of paint in a car, there is no right
relation among managers, investors, and other corporate participants.
The relation must be worked out one firm at a time. A change in technology-whether the technology of applying paint or the technology of
assembling blocks of shares to change control of a firm-will be reflected in changes in the operation or governance of corporations. To
understand corporate law you must understand how the balance of advantage among devices for controlling agency costs differs across firms
and shifts from time to time. The role of corporate law at any instant is
to establish rights among participants in the venture. Who governs?
For whose benefit? But without answering difficult questions about the
effectiveness of different devices for controlling agency costs, we cannot tell the appropriate allocation of rights. We will have trouble establishing background rules (that is, principles that apply in the absence of
a different term incorporated in a particular corporate contract). We
certainly cannot answer questions such as whether and when it is appropriate to override contractual choices actually made or to fetter the
ability of participants to change the terms established when the firm
was created.
III.

REAL AND UNREAL CONTRACTS

The rhetoric of contract is a staple of political and philosophical
debate. Contract is a term for voluntary and unanimous agreement
among affected parties. It is therefore a powerful image. It shows up in
arguments about "social contracts" that justify political society. The
founding of the United States was accompanied by much contractarian
reasoning. Philosophers who resort to the "original position" to establish a definition ofjustice are using a contractarian argument. Yet arguments about social contracts are problematic. They are constructs
rather than real contracts. Even if our forbears had entered into an
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actual contract, why would these rules bind later generations? Such
doubts are also part of our political heritage; Jefferson accordingly suggested that the Constitution expire and be renewed whenever half of
the living had been born since the last renegotiation. Perhaps the corporate contract, like the social contract, is no more than a rhetorical
device. After all, investors do not sit down and haggle among themselves about the terms. As a rule investors buy stock in the market and
know little more than its price. The terms were established by entrepreneurs, investment banks, and managers. Changes in the rules are
accomplished by voting rather than unanimous consent. So why not
view the corporation as a republican government rather than as a set of
contracts?
The corporate venture has many real contracts. The terms present
in the articles of incorporation at the time the firm is established or
issues stock are real agreements. Everything to do with the relation between the firm and the suppliers of labor (employees), goods and services (suppliers and contractors) is contractual. So with the rules in
force when the firm raises money-whether by issuing debt, the terms
of which often are negotiated at great length over a table, or by issuing
equity, the terms of which affect the price of the issue. Many changes in
the rules are approved by large investors after negotiation with management. And of course the rules that govern how rules change are
also real contracts. The articles of incorporation typically allow
changes to be made by bylaw or majority vote; they could as easily prevent changes, or call for super-majority vote, or allow change freely but
require nonconsenting investors to be bought out. That the articles
allow uncompensated changes through voting is a real contractual
choice. And many remaining terms of the corporate arrangement are
contractual in the sense that they are "presets" of fall-back terms specified by law and not varied by the corporation. These terms become
part of the set of contracts just as provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code become part of commercial contracts when not addressed
explicitly.
These contracts usually are negotiated by representatives. Indenture trustees negotiate on behalf of bondholders, unions on behalf of
employees, investment banks on behalf of equity investors. Sometimes
terms are not negotiated directly but are simply promulgated, in the
way auto rental companies promulgate the terms of their rental contracts. The entrepreneurs or managers may adopt a set of rules and say
"take them or leave them." This is contracting nonetheless. We enforce the terms in auto rental contracts, as we enforce the terms of a
trust even though the beneficiaries had no say in their framing. The
terms in rental contracts, warranties, and the like are real contracts because their value (or detriment) is reflected in price.
The corporation's choice of governance mechanisms does not create substantial third-party effects-that is, does not injure persons who
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are not voluntary participants in the venture.' 3 Investors, employees,
and others can participate or go elsewhere. Let us suppose that entrepreneurs simply pick terms out of a hat. They cannot force investors to
pay more than what the resulting investment instruments are worth;
there are too many other places to put one's money. Unless entrepreneurs can fool the investors, a choice of terms that reduces investors'
expected returnswill produce a corresponding reduction in price. So
the people designing the terms under which the corporation will be run
have the right incentives. Suppose they must decide whether to allow
managers to take corporate opportunities or instead require them to be
used by the firm (or sold to third parties unaffiliated with the firm).
Managers' ability to appropriate opportunities poses obvious risks of
diversion;' it may also allow efficient use of opportunities and be a
source of compensation for managers, reducing the need to pay them
with cash from corporate coffers. The net effects, for good or ill, will
influence the price investors pay for stock. If the managers make the
"wrong" decision-that is, choose the term inferior as investors see
things-they must pay for their mistake. To obtain an (inefficient) right
to divert opportunities they must pay in advance. The same process
applies to terms adopted later; undesirable terms reduce the price the
stock fetches in the market, so that investors who buy thereafter will get
no less than they pay for. In general, all the terms in corporate governance are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties. They are thereafter tested for
desirable properties; the firms that pick the wrong terms will fail in
competition with other firms competing for capital. It is unimportant
that terms may not be "negotiated"; the pricing and testing mechanisms are all that matters, as long as there are no effects on third parties. This should come as no shock to anyone familiar with the Goase
Theorem. 14

Are the terms of corporate governance priced? The provisions in
articles of incorporation and bylaws often are picky and obscure. Many
are not listed in the prospectus of the firm's stock. Buyers of the original issue and in the aftermarket alike may know nothing of the terms in
use, let alone whether a staggered board of directors or the existence of
cumulative voting will make them better off. Yet it is unimportant
whether knowledge about the nature or effect of the terms is widespread, at least for public corporations. The mechanism by which
stocks are valued ensures that the price reflects the terms of governance and operation, just as it reflects the identity of the managers and
the products the firm produces.
The price of stocks traded in public markets is established by professional investors, not by amateurs.' 5 These professionals-market
13. The few third party effects that do crop up are discussed infra Part IV.B.1.
14. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1, 7 (1960).
15. The process we describe below is reasonably well understood, and it has been
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makers, arbitrage departments of investment banks, managers of mutual funds and pension trusts, and others-handle huge sums that they
are willing to use to purchase undervalued stocks. They study the
firm's profits and prospectus and bid or sell accordingly. People who
do this poorly will find the funds at their disposal dwindling; people
who do it well will command additional sums. At any given instant, the
professional traders are those who have generally been successful at
assessing the worth of stock. If the price of a stock at any time is not
right in relation to the price it will have in the future, then professionals
can make a lot of money. If the terms of corporate provisions and the
details of corporate structure have any effect on investors' welfare, this
will be reflected in the profits of the firm and hence the eventual price
of the stock. Professionals trade among themselves in a way that brings
the present value closer to the future value; if it is known that the stock
will be worth twenty dollars in a year, then people will bid that price
(less the time value of money) now. No one has a good reason to hold
off in this process, because if he does someone else will take the profit.
The more astute the professional investors, and the more quickly they
can move funds into and out of particular holdings, the faster the process of adjustment will occur.
The process eventually makes it difficult even for professional traders to make money, unless they are the first to obtain or act on a piece
of information affecting future value. A great deal of data, including
evidence that most professional investors are unable to "beat the market," supports the position that prices quickly and accurately reflect
public information about firms. Amateur investors then trade at, the
same price the professionals obtain. These amateurs do not need to
know anything about corporate governance and other provisions; the
value of these mysterious things is wrapped up in the price established
by the professionals. The price reflects the effects, good or'bad, of corporate law and contracts, just as it reflects the effects of good and bad
products. This is yet another example of the way in which markets
transmit the value of information through price, which is more "informed" than any single participant in the market. 16
To say that the price of a stock reflects the value of the firm's govso completely discussed elsewhere that we offer only a sketch. See J. Lone & M.
Hamilton, The Stock Market: Theories and Evidence 87-96 (1973); R. Brealey, An In-

troduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks 4-5 (2d ed. 1983); Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 569-72 (1984); see 'also
J. Cragg & B. Malkiel, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices (1982). The process of adjustment to information that we describe happens exceptionally fast, usually

within the day the professional investor learns the information. Pearce & Roley, Stock
Prices and Economic News, 58J. Bus. 49, 66 (1985).

16. See T. Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (1980); Grossman & Stiglitz, Information and Competitive Price Systems, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 246 (1976); Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information Efficiency,
70 Am. Econ. Rev. 874 (1980).
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ernance and related rules is not necessarily to say that the price does so
perfectly. There may be surprises in store, for a firm or for all firms,
that make estimates about the effects of governance provisions inaccurate. But these problems of information and assessment also affect any
other way of evaluating the effects of governance devices. That is, if
professional investors with their fortunes on the line are unable to anticipate the true effects of nonvoting stock or some other wrinkle in a
concrete case, how are members of state legislatures or other alternative rule-givers to do better? To put this differently, it does not matter
if markets are not perfectly efficient, unless some other social institution does better at evaluating the likely effects of corporate governance
devices. The prices will be more informative than the next best alternative, which is all anyone can demand of any device:
This means that we need not enter the debate about whether
stocks are priced perfectly.' 7 Prices do not reflect very well information
that is not available to the public. They reflect the value of stock to
public investors with scattered holdings rather than to insiders or
others with the ability to control the firm's destiny. For any given firm,
there will be an irreducible amount of error in the pricing-after all,
information that increases the accuracy of prices is costly, and the "perfect price" may cost more to achieve than it is worth. The more accurate the price becomes, the less private gain is available to pros who
study the stock to find bargains; they therefore do not find it profitable
to pursue perfection. None of this matters for our purposes, unless
some better device is available. No one argues that regulators are better at valuing terms of corporate governance than are markets.
One might say that the effects of obscure terms in articles of incorporation will be too small to affect price, but prices turn out to be sensitive to changes in governance. It turns out to be hard to find any
interesting item that does not have an influence on price.' 8 And even
those who believe that markets are less efficient than generally supposed concede that changes in prices reflect the marginal value, to investors outside the managerial group, of publicly-disclosed information
about the firm. Governance structures are known to anyone seeking
the information, so the pricing mechanism will embody their effects for
good or ill.
Let us now suppose, however, that not all terms induce accurate
changes in the price of stock. Unless prices are systematically wrong
17. For a summary of data on the efficiency of market prices, see Gordon &

Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 761 (1985).

18. See the data collected and discussed in Easterbrook, supra note 1. One of the
rare exceptions is derivative litigation, which does not appear to affect the value of
shares. See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261, 277-83
(1986).
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about the effects of features of governance, as opposed to being noisy
and uninformative, managers still have appropriate incentives. The
long run will arrive sooner or later, and terms that are not beneficial for
investors will stand revealed; the firm will lose out in competition for
investors' money. We therefore treat even hard-to-value terms as contractual. To disregard the terms that appear in corporate documents or
to attempt to require corporations to employ governance devices that
they have attempted to avoid would just induce the firms to make offsetting adjustments. For example, if corporate law should forbid managers to divert corporate opportunities to themselves, they might
respond by drawing higher salaries or working less hard to open up
new business opportunities. Similarly, a mandatory term that increased
the length of a warranty supplied with a refrigerator would lead to an
increase in the price. If the longer warranty was worth the price, the
seller would have offered the term in the first place, charged the higher
price, and made more money. One cannot tinker with one term in a
contract confident that the change will make any party better off after
other terms have adjusted.' 9 Because so many terms are open to explicit contracting, it is almost always possible to make an end run
around any effort to defeat a particular term.
If it is possible to demonstrate that the terms chosen by firms are
both (a) unpriced and (b) systematically perverse from investors' standards, then it might be possible to justify the prescription of a
mandatory term by law. This makes sense, however, only when one is
sure that the selected term will increase the joint wealth of the participants-that is, that it is the term that the parties would have selected
with full information and costless contracting. But this, too, is a contractual way of looking at the corporation. This formula is the one
courts use to fill the gaps in explicit contracts that inevitably arise because it is impossible to cover every contingency. Any system of law
that recognizes explicit contracts must deal with gaps and ambiguities.
The gap-filling rule will call on courts to duplicate the terms the parties
would have selected, in their joint interest, if they had contracted explicitly. It promotes clear thought to understand that the silence or
ambiguity in corporate documents itself is a problem of contract, one
the parties could solve if they wished and if the costs of negotiating
were worthwhile in light of the stakes. High information costs-the
ones that impede accurate reflection of governance features in the price
of stock-also impede more complete transacting.
This is not to say that corporate contracts are ideal. Perhaps there
are third party effects. Perhaps there are obstacles to reaching the ap19. This is the Coase Theorem again. See also Epstein, The Social Consequences
of Common Law Rules, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717, 1750-51 (1982); Schwartz, Justice and
the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
107 (1986). On warranties see Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
Yale L.J. 1297 (1981).
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propriate agreements. Perhaps optimal terms, once reached, will be
altered in ways that enable managers to escape the consequences of
their acts; terms changed by voting may fit in this category. The next
section discusses the limits of contracts, both actual and implied.
IV.

TRUMPING THE CORPORATE CONTRACT

Many parts of the law contain contract-defeating doctrines. Some
of these may be applicable to corporate contracts. We look at the principal ones.
A. Protecting ContractingParties
Think of the principal reasons why private agreements may not be
enforced. 20 Contracts signed under threat of force displace voluntary
arrangements and are unjust; force is therefore illegal. Fraud will vitiate an agreement. Infants and others who do not know their own interests cannot contract. Sometimes people's perceptual apparatuses do
not work well. They underestimate the chance that certain risks
(floods, earthquakes, failures of the products they buy) will come to
pass and as a result may not choose rationally when confronted with
choices about such risks; at other times they may think the probability
greater than it is (nuclear calamity). When a person is confronted with
a problem or risk for the first (or only) time in his life, the chance of
error is greatest. Choices that are made repeatedly and tested against
experience are more likely to be accurate-both because each person
learns from experience, and because the mass of persons contains
many astute searchers, who identify "bargains" and so influence the
terms on which all may trade.
Some contracts are not enforced because they have adverse effects
on third parties. Contracts to pollute affect people who are not parties
to the deal. Cartels (contracts among business rivals to raise prices)
affect customers. So we have laws to control pollution and monopolies,
and much regulation is based on a belief that a dearth of competition
has produced monopoly prices. Legal rules that protect people in need
of rescue from excessive prices charged by salvors serve a similar function. Sometimes the argument for intervention by the state is reinforced by a claim that the person paying the price should be a
beneficiary of an income transfer; for example, rent control and minimum wages sometimes- are justified by reference to the relative wealth
of landlord and tenant or employer and employee.
None of these justifications for intervention applies to intra-corporate affairs. Investors are not candidates for transfers of wealth; this is
not a branch of poverty law. Investors and other participants agree on
the stakes: money. They therefore would agree unanimously to
20. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1129 (1986).
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whatever rule maximizes the total value of the firm. Questions of distribution among investors are unimportant because that just causes the
price they pay for their stakes to change. There is no fraud; the rules of
corporate governance are open for all to see. (There may be fraud in
the operation of the firm, but concealed violations of any rules are
wrongful; recall that our concern is with the selection of rules of
governance.)
It might seem that the argument based on perceptual biases justifies intervention. Few investors know much about corporate governance; few are repeat players; therefore most are likely to misunderstand
the risks they take. Yet as we have explained, in corporate transactions
risks are priced through the stock market, and these prices respond to
the knowledge of professional investors. These prices protect ignorant
investors automatically. The "game" of corporate governance is most
assuredly a repeat play game in which people learn from experience.
Each corporation has an extended life, so the effects of governance devices may be observed. When scores of corporations use similar devices, it is possible to find out how they fare compared with each other.
Investors as a whole (and therefore prices) will be informed and informative, even though most investors are baffled by the rules embedded in corporate contracts.
Participation in corporations is uniquely amenable to contracting
because even the ignorant have an army of helpers. The stock market is
one. Employees work at terms negotiated by unions (and nonunion
employees can observe the terms offered at other firms, which supply
much information). Managers and corporations employ headhunters
to convey information and match person to job. Holders of bonds are
protected by trustees, which negotiate terms and monitor compliance.
Many people invest in corporations through their bank accounts; syndicates of banks (after conducting thorough review) pool the money of
depositors for investment in corporations. Much pension money is
under professional management; the funds hire experts for the benefit
of investors who need not even know what stocks they indirectly hold.
Individual investors can hire professional advice directly through brokerage houses or indirectly by investing in mutual funds. They can
hedge their bets by buying diversified portfolios of investments, getting
the return of the market as a whole (or'some subset) rather than that of
an individual firm.
In sum, knowledge about corporate transactions does not depend
on the wisdom of individual investors. What is not understood through
professional advice is priced, so that the investor gets what he pays for
(in the absence of fraud). If we honor one-shot contracts for once-in-alifetime transactions, such as the construction of a house, the case for
treating as binding contracts the terms under which corporations operate is ironclad. No contract used in our society is more likely to satisfy
the conditions for enforcing voluntary agreements.
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There is nonetheless a puzzle. Corporate law allows firms to strike
almost any imaginable bargain with debt investors, with employees,
with suppliers, with local governments that supply essential services
from fire protection to the education of the next generation of workers.
These will be written and enforced according to the law of contracts.
All of these "constituencies" may make formidable investments in the
firm, in the sense that they have made irrevocable, specialized commitments of physical or human capital; all are left to protect themselves
through contract. The scattered "mandatory" devices in corporate law
operate only with respect to the equity investors. The board of directors (which equity claimants alone choose) is subject to certain limits;
managers (which the board and hence equity investors pick) may not
contract out of the "duty of loyalty." Yet the most powerful device for
protecting participants in the venture-liquid markets with professional
investors-applies exclusively to investors, principally equity investors.
Why is it that these well-protected participants are subject to
mandatory terms, while others who gain less from markets must protect
themselves, and devil take the hindmost? The answer lies in part in the
special nature of the "residual claim" held by equity investors, a claim
to "what is left over" rather than to a definable return such as a wage or
a payment of interest, and in part in one of the oddities of markets:
that when shares are widely traded, no one has the right incentive to
gather information and make optimal decisions. For now, though, keep
this difference in mind as a puzzle.
B. The Inefficient Term
1. Third-Party Effects and Collective Decisions. - The argument that
contracts are optimal applies only if the contracting parties bear the full
costs of their decisions and reap all the gains. It applies only if contracts are enforced after they have been reached. The argument also
depends on the availability of the full set of possible contracts. If some
types of agreements are foreclosed, the ones actually reached may not
be optimal. Some of these problems crop up in corporate law and require careful attention to the limits of contracting.
One type of third-party effect is created by the peculiar nature of
information and the difficulty of arranging reciprocal disclosure of information among firms. A detailed set of mandatory rules is imposed
on corporations by the securities laws. 2 1 One possible reason is that
firms would disclose too little information unless compelled. Managers
seek to disclose all the information that is privately optimal to investors,
because that will induce investors to part with more money for their
shares. But some disclosures may be beneficial to other firms, too, and
21. We have considered the justification for mandatory rules elsewhere. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, ?Vandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va. L.

Rev. 669

(1984).
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unless legal rules set up a requirement of reciprocal disclosure no firm
may find it optimal to disclose information that is valuable to investors.
Some kinds of disclosure may be complex, and legal rules can establish
a common language that will facilitate transmission of information.
Tender offers, bids for the outstanding stock of a firm, are another
way in which one firm's acts may affect another's. A tender offer is a
way of gathering up the equity interests to make some fundamental
change in the firm that the existing managers oppose; it is an appeal
over managers' heads to the equity investors. Usually a tender offer is
made at a substantial premium over market price. Investors contracting at the time the firm goes public may wish to make tender offers
easy to arrange. Bids are delightfully profitable events; more, putative
bidders serve as possible monitors, holding down the agency costs of
management whether or not a given firm is the object of a bid. So
before a firm knows whether there will be a bid, all involved may find it
useful to invite scrutiny and bids. But once potential bidders have become interested, or there is a bid on the table, it may be in the interest
of the target's managers and investors alike to change plans and conduct an auction. This will raise the price they realize. It may also discourage monitoring, but after the monitoring has occurred and the
bidding has begun, the investors in the target no longer care about this
benefit. The contract that is optimal ex ante may not be optimal ex
post. The investors in the target may quickly change their own contracts, creating an auction. But if such change is possible, then it is not
possible to enforce the contract that (by hypothesis) was optimal at the
beginning.
Note that this presents a partial view of the available contracts. It
assumes that only contracts among participants in targets are possible.
Suppose, however, investors in targets could also make contracts with
putative bidders. Perhaps they could sell options to purchase their
shares at certain prices or under defined conditions. If it were possible
to contract in advance with bidders, they could restrain themselves
from adopting new strategies only when it looks like a bid is in prospect. Such options turn out to be both impractical (because they imply
contracts with a world of potential bidders, at prohibitive transaction
costs) and illegal (because the Williams Act 22 forbids bidders to line up
shares in advance of making a public announcement, and it also forbids
the preferential purchases that such options imply). The impracticality
and illegality of an important contractual device may mean that the contracts actually adopted are not optimal. This may-just may-mean
that legal rules can improve on the corporate contracts.
The difficulty of enforcing contracts and observing them also may
create opportunities for beneficial intervention. The enforcement
problem is simple to see. Suppose a contract to hold an auction for a
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
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target is optimal, both ex ante and ex post, for investors in the putative
target. They adopt such a contract explicitly. They also explicitly forbid the managers' "defending": that is, they want the firm sold at the
highest possible price, not kept "independent." But can they get what
they want? Any auctioneering strategy creates some risk of the bid falling through. If today's bids are not high enough, an auctioneer may
take a painting off the market for a short time, until a higher-valuing
bidder appears. The duration of an auction is flexible, and the highest
bidder may not appear for a while. Yet any device that allows the managers to defeat the first few bids-such as a rule that no bid may be
made without the managers' approval, a rule that poison pill stock approximates-also can be used to defeat any bid. How could anyone tell
which strategy was being followed? Would the managers themselves
know? They might set an unrealistic reservation price, subjectively believing that they were peddling the firm while objectively making the
sale impossible. The difficulty of assuring compliance with the terms of
the corporate contract may make particular kinds of contracts less
useful.
As for observing contracts, consider this: A strategy of easy-to-acquire may be optimal ex ante, and a strategy of auctioneering may be
optimal ex post; yet, if an auctioneering strategy becomes known, bids
may not materialize. Therefore, the best strategy for a given firm may
be to look easily acquirable at all times, but to follow an auctioneering
strategy at all times. The strategy privately optimal for the target, in
other words, is to fool the bidders. This does not violate any rule of
contracting; the strategy is beneficial to parties to the contract. Putative
bidders have no entitlement to learn the target's true strategy, any
more than owners of land have an entitlement to be told what use the
buyer will make of the land. Holding information in confidence often is
both privately and socially optimal; firms prospecting for ore would do
less searching if they had to reveal to the world what they had found
before acquiring the mineral-bearing lands. Yet if some putative
targets adopt this hidden strategy, other firms with genuine easy-toacquire policies will be injured. Potential bidders will have a hard time
telling which firms will resist and which will not, and therefore they may
reduce their monitoring and bidding activities even with respect to
firms that would not conduct auctions. The uncertainty concerning the
contractual strategy selected will interfere with the process of governance of other firms.
This introduces still another sort of problem: there may be a divergence between private and social optimality. We have assumed so
far that investors and other corporate players design rules that are best
for their firm. And so they do. Yet there i another perspective from
which investors do not care about the performance of a given firm.
They can invest in any or every firm. In the long run, therefore, they
care about the performance of the economy, not that of a given firm.
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Some firms may do better, some worse, but an investor who does not
know beforehand which firm will be which wants only to maximize the
average performance. It is possible to show that investors who look
only to the welfare of targets will set up rules with too much defense,

from the perspective of society.2 3 Investors who think themselves likely

to hold interests in either bidders or targets are not interested in rules
that try to engross a greater portion of gains for targets; they want instead to facilitate the process with the least possible cost devoted to
attempting to allocate the gains among firms.
An example shows why. Suppose the FCC is going to award a license to operate a TV station and ten firms are in the running. An
investor in one of these firms will want it to spend money on lawyers,
market surveys, and the like, until the marginal dollar spent trying to
capture the license brings in one dollar's worth of anticipated profits
from having the license (discounted by the probability of not receiving
the award). If the license is worth $1,000,000, each firm might spend
$50,000, for a total of $500,000 among firms. An investor with stakes
in all ten firms would want nothing of the sort, however. He would
want all ten firms to do nothing, compelling the FCC to award the license by lot. That way the winner would get the highest possible net
value of the license, $1,000,000, and the investors would bear no, costs
at all and therefore receive the whole profit. The privately beneficial
rule (spend until the marginal return is zero) is neither the socially beneficial rule nor the rule that is best for an investor holding stock in all
there are gains to be had in
firms. When situations of this sort 2occur,
4
contracts.
corporate
the
overriding
The investor wants to maximize the value of his holdings, not the
value of a given stock. The value of holdings is highest if the value of
each stock is highest. Whenever there is a question about the apportionment of gain, the investor prefers whatever rule maximizes the net
gain to be had-which means increasing the probability of a gain-producing transaction and reducing the costs of realizing each gain. The
rules for dealing with gain-creating opportunities will be established
before any particular opportunity is in sight, and so each investor will
prefer the set of rules that maximizes the total value (wealth) enjoyed
23. See Grossman & Hart, The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of
Asymmetric Information, 36 J. Fin. 253, 261-66 (1981); Grossman & Hart, Takeover
Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42,
60-64 (1980); cf. Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2J.L. Econ.
& Organization 229 (1986).
24. The investor could achieve the gains without the state's aid by buying all ten
firms, but that would come at a cost in diversification. And sometimes the problem of
fighting over a fixed pie comes about precisely because an investor tries to gather up all
of the interests. Suppose a TV magnate had started making tender offers for the stock
of the firms that were trying to acquire the license. Then we could have had a series of
costly auctions as each firm tried to capture all of the gains to be had from bringing all
under a common umbrella to save the costs of bidding.
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by the investors, without regard to how the return is shared among corporations. It is possible to show this with formal logic. 25 It follows that
corporate rules that facilitate costly fighting over who gets the gains
from some profitable transaction are not likely to survive in practice
and that in filling gaps in existing contracts it is safe to disregard questions of allocation.
In thinking about tender offers, an investor does not know whether
his firm will be a bidder or a target. We therefore should not expect
him to worry much about creating rules that will transfer money to
targets (if there is a bid), for that is likely to cost him if his firm turns
out to be a bidder. Almost all investors are repeat players; if they do
not get cut in on gains today, they will tomorrow, and they seek to reduce the process costs along the way. There is one potential objection
to this way of looking at optimal corporate contracts: risk aversion. We
have assumed so far that an investor is indifferent between a ten percent chance of receiving $1,000 and a certainty of receiving $100. Most
investors are risk averse, which implies that the division of gains may
have a role in optimal contracts after all. Perhaps investors seek ways
to cut down on risk even if that also cuts down on anticipated return. If
they do, that behavior has substantial implications for how to supply
missing terms in corporate contracts-maybe even for when to override
real contracts.
We shall nonetheless largely ignore risk aversion with respect to
public corporations. 2 6 Our rationale is simple: diversification. Investors who dislike risk can get rid of risk easily. They may hold low-risk
instruments (high grade bonds and Treasury obligations). Investors
hold equity if and only if the expected value of these investments beats
the return available from other sources. Holding a basket of equities
enables the investors to realize these expected returns, free from firmspecific risk (whether risk of the firm's business ventures or risk of managers' dishonesty). Those who hold equity instruments may diversify
through mutual funds or by selecting some other broad basket. A di25. DeAngelo, Competition and Unanimity, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1981);
Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 329 (1983);
Makowski &Pepall, Easy Proofs of Unanimity and Optimality Without Spanning: A Pedagogical Note, 40J. Fin. 1245 (1985). The most important assumption leading to unanimous support for wealth maximization is a competitive capital market. Roughly
speaking, this means that any one firm's production and financing decisions have negligible effects on both the price of any given investment (that is, any given bundle of risk
and return from one firm or many), and on the menu of risk-return combinations that
investors can obtain by holding portfolios of instruments issued by different firms.
When there is competition, investors agree that the corporation should have the objective of maximizing wealth because greater wealth gives them the ability to consume or
purchase portfolios with greater cash returns; in either event, they exercise greater command over resources. Given the depth and richness of the world's capital markets, it is
fair to conclude that the conditions for investors' unanimity are satisfied in practice.
•26. Our work on limited liability and close corporations deals with risk aversion at
greater length. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9.
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versified portfolio will not get rid of risk that goes with the market. It
will, however, essentially eliminate the risk that goes with conflicts
among firms and scraps over the allocation of gains and losses. A person who holds a diversified portfolio has an investment in the economy
as a whole and therefore wants whatever social or private governance
rules maximize the value of all firms put together. He is not interested
in maximizing one firm's value if it comes out of the hide of another
corporation. Diversification is cheap in the current economy. It costs
less to buy and hold a diversified fund than to trade a small number of
stocks.
This appears to overlook the fact that many people are not diversified. Some are undiversified by design. Corporate managers have
much of their wealth tied up in the firms they manage, and this lack of
diversification reduces the agency costs of management. These managers, as investors, will be risk averse and interested in the allocation of
gains and losses. This is not a reason to treat corporate law as if it
ought to care about these allocations, however; the risk aversion of
managers is a regrettable. cost of the corporate form, not a reason to
select a rule other than the wealth-maximizing one. As for other undiversified investors-the "stock-pickers" who hold five to ten stocks
and trade actively-these people are simply telling us that they are not
risk averse. Recall that the only reason to care about diversification is
that people who are risk averse might want a rule maximizing the lower
bound of returns rather than maximizing the expected return, and thus
social wealth. If the people who do not like risk can look after themselves at low cost, then there is no remaining reason not to select
whatever rule maximizes value. And for what it is worth, the vast majority of investments are held by people with diversified portfolios. The
principal investors in most firms are institutions of one sort or another:
mutual funds, trust departments of banks, pension funds, and other instrumentalities for diversifying holdings. It is a bad idea to reduce the
wealth of the prudent many for the dubious benefit of gamblers.
2. Mistakes. - Some people take particular provisions of corporate
organization as proof that the provisions could not have been selected
by any contractual process. Suppose the articles of Acme Widget Corporation provide that in deciding whether managers may take a corporate opportunity for their own benefit, interested directors are entitled
to vote. Suppose the articles thrust on investors the burden of showing
that a self-dealing transaction was unfair to the firm, whether or not the
manager disclosed the transaction and obtained approval beforehand.
Would not such provisions be so one-sided, so fraught with danger to
investors, that their very existence shows managerial domination and
overreaching? Would not that justify the imposition by law of terms
more favorable to investors?
Two kinds of argument might be at work here. One is that some
third-party effect of the sort mentioned in the preceding section has
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caused the interests of a given corporation to diverge from the social
optimum. The other is that the particular term in the corporate charter
is a blunder, as its investors see things. Divergence between private
and social interest is rare and does not appear to be at work in these
examples. That leaves mistake. But whose mistake? The investors',
for not seeing through the ruse and reducing the price paid for the
securities? Or the critics', for believing that the terms disserve investors' interests? Unless the person challenging a provision of the corporate contract can make a convincing argument that the consequences of
that term could not have been appreciated by investors and priced efficiently, there is no reason for intervening to correct a mistake. Any
complexity that might prevent professional investors from recognizing
the true effects of a given term probably has no less a baleful effect on
the critics' ability to do so. So the presumptive hypothesis is that the
mistake has been made by the critic, not by the firm and the investors.
Whenever the costs and benefits of a practice are knowable, they
will be reflected in the prices at which the corporation's stock trades.
The critic who says that some important term of corporate governance
has escaped this mechanism is saying either that the costs and benefits
are not knowable or that he alone knows the costs and benefits. Now of
course he can reveal these; if people believe him, the market will respond without the need for governmental intervention. The more
likely hypothesis, however, is that the people who are backing their beliefs with cash are correct; they have every reason to avoid mistakes,
while critics (be they academics or regulators) are rewarded for novel
rather than accurate beliefs. Market professionals who estimate these
things wrongly suffer directly; academics and regulators who estimate
wrongly do not pay a similar penalty. You should trust those who wager with their own money to do the calculations correctly. They may be
wrong, but they are less likely to be wrong than are academics and regulators, who wager with other people's money.
Corporate governance devices that have survived in many firms for
extended periods are particularly unlikely candidates for challenge as
mistakes. We have emphasized that the durability of a practice both
enables people to gauge its effects and allows competition among firms
to weed out the practices that do not assist investors. There is no similar process of winnowing out of academic ideas or regulations. Quite
the contrary; mandatory terms prescribed by law halt the process of
natural selection and evaluation. Unless there is a strong reason to believe that regulation has a comparative advantage over competition in
markets in evaluating the effects of corporate contracts, there is no basis for displacing actual arrangements as "mistakes" or "exploitation."
C. The Latecomer Term
Much of the discussion has proceeded as if all parts of the corporate contract were established at the beginning. "The beginning" for
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any participant is when he enters the venture-when he becomes an
employee, invests, and so on. This is the critical time for most purposes because the time of entry is when the costs and benefits of governance arrangements are priced. If a term is good or bad at the
beginning, adjustments in the prices even everything up. But of course
many things change after the beginning. The firm may reincorporate in
Nevada. It may adopt staggered terms for members of the board of
directors or a "fair price amendment." It may abolish the executive
committee of the board, get rid of all the independent directors or create a board with a majority of independent directors. What are we to
make of these changes?
Changes of this sort have some things in common: they are proposed by the existing managers (unless approved by the board of directors, no change in an ongoing firm's rules will be adopted), the
proposals are accepted by voting among the equity investors, and the
winning side in the vote does not compensate the losing side. If the
changes are adverse to existing participants in the venture, there will be
price adjustments, but these adjustments do not compensate the participants. If an amendment reduces the expected profitability of the
firm by an amount worth one dollar per share, the price will fall and
existing investors will experience a capital loss of one dollar per share.
They can sell, but they can't avoid the loss. The buyers will get shares
worth what they pay; the investors at the time of the change are out of
luck. The mechanism by which entrepreneurs and managers bear the
cost of unfavorable terms does not work-not in any direct way, anyway-for latecomer terms. It will work eventually. Latecomer terms
that injure investors will reduce the firm's ability to raise money and
compete in product markets. But these eventual reactions are not remedies; they explain why firms that choose inferior governance devices
do not survive, and they show why widespread, enduring practices are
likely to be beneficial, but they do nothing for participants in the ventures that are about to be ground under by the heel of history.
The process of voting 2 7 controls adverse terms to a degree but not
perfectly. Investors are rationally uninterested in votes, not only because no investor's vote will change the outcome of the election but
also because the information necessary to cast an informed vote is not
readily available. Shareholders' approval of changes is likely to be unreliable as an indicator of their interests, because scattered shareholders in public firms do not have the time, information, or incentive to
review all proposed changes. Votes are not sold, at least not without
the shares. The difference between governance provisions established
at the beginning and provisions added later suggests some caution in
treating the two categories alike. Some of the hardest questions in corporate law concern arrangements that are adopted or changed after the
27. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983).
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1443 1989

1444

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1416

firm is under way and the capital has been raised. Thus doctrines of
corporate law refusing to allow shareholders to ratify waste (except
unanimously) are well founded. Yet the rules for amending the rules
are themselves part of the original articles, and it is (or should be) possible to draft limitations on amendment. These most commonly take
the form of provisions designating some amendments as transactions
from which investors may dissent and demand appraisal. Moreover,
amendments to governance structures may spark proxy contests in
which investors' attention is focused, and they also may call forth takeover bids. So voting, or at least the opportunity for review set in place
by the voting mechanism, is a partial substitute for the pricing mechanism that applies at the beginning.
One candidate for a rule of law that could overcome a problem in
the contracting process is a rule that differentiates among terms according to the time of their adoption. It could provide that terms in place at
the beginning (at the time the firm is founded, goes public, or issues
significant amounts of stock) are always to be honored unless there are
demonstrable third-party effects, 28 while terms adopted later that appear to increase the agency costs of management are valid only if
adopted by supermajority vote at successive annual meetings or if dissenting investors are bought out. (The dual-meeting rule would allow
an intervening proxy or takeover contest to prevent the change from
going into effect.) Yet if such a constraint on amendments is beneficial
to investors, why are supermajority and dual-meeting requirements so
rare in corporate documents? Investors can and do appreciate the risk
that latecomer terms will be damaging, yet perhaps rules that slow
down the adoption of changes would be more damaging still on balance. It is not our purpose here to draft rules of law. It is important,
however, to keep the latecomer term in mind as a potential problem in
a contractual approach to corporate law.
D. Why Is There Corporate Law?
One natural question after all this business of corporation-as-contract is: why law? Why not just abolish corporate law and let people
negotiate whatever contracts they please? The short but not entirely
satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of terms available offthe-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of
contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing quorums, and so on, that almost everyone will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial decisions supply these terms "for
free" to every corporation, enabling the venturers to concentrate on
matters that are specific to their undertaking. Even when they work
through all the issues they expect will arise, they are apt to miss something. All sorts of complexities will arise later. Corporate law-and in
28. See supra Part IV.B.I.
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particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts-fills in the blanks
and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for
had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly
in advance. On this view corporate law supplements but never displaces actual bargains-save in situations of third-party effects or
latecomer terms.
And there is a ready source of guidance for corporate codes and
judicial decisions to draw on in filling in blanks (or establishing background terms): the deals people actually strike when they bargain over
the subject. These actual bargains offer models for other firms too. It
is possible that firms that have come to actual bargains on a subject are
different from firms that remain silent; the very difference is the reason
for the bargain. Possible, but unlikely; differences in transaction costs
or perspicacity are more plausible, unless there is some identifiable difference that calls for different rules of governance. Larger firms will
find it worthwhile to specify things others leave open, because the gains
from resolution increase with the size of the firm. As amateur investors
benefit from the work of professionals, so smaller firms and courts can
benefit from the work of professional negotiators who solve problems
for larger firms.
The story is not complete, however, because it still does not answer the question "why law?". Why don't law firms or corporate service bureaus or investment banks compile sets of terms on which
corporations may be constructed? They can peddle these terms and
recover the cost of working through all of the problems. Yet it is costly
for the parties (or any private supplier of rules) to ponder unusual situations and dicker for the adoption of terms. Parties or their surrogates
must identify problems and then transact in sufficient detail to solve
them. This may all be wasted effort if the problem does not occur. Because change is the one constant of corporate life, waste is a certainty.
Often the type of problem that the firm encounters does not occur to
anyone until after the venture is under way. Court systems have a comparative advantage in supplying answers to questions that do not occur
in time to be resolved ex ante. Common law systems need not answer
questions unless they occur. This is an economizing device; it avoids
working through problems that do not arise. The accumulation of
cases dealing with unusual problems then supplies a level of detail that
is costly to duplicate through private bargaining. To put it differently,
"contractual" terms for many kinds of problems turn out to be public
goods!
Even if law firms, investment banks, or other private suppliers of
solutions could specify optimal solutions, they could not readily supply
answers for all marginal cases. No one firm could capture all of the
gains from working out all problems in advance, because other firms
could copy the answers without paying the creator. If the value of new
solutions is hard to appropriate, and if the gain from private bargaining
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is small, people will leave things to be worked out later. As we have
emphasized repeatedly, what should be worked out and supplied by
corporate law is the rule that, if uniformly applied, will maximize the
value of corporate endeavor as a whole. The law completes openended contracts. There is no reason why it should be used to impose a
term that defeats actual bargains or reduces the venturers' joint wealth.
V. MAXIMANDS

An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of a corporation removes from the field of interesting questions one that has
plagued many writers: what is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit
(and for whom)? Social welfare more broadly defined? Is there anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to maximize profit over the long run or the short run? Our response to such
questions is: "Who Cares?" If the New York Times is formed to publish
a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be allowed
to object. Those who came in at the beginning actually consented, and
those who came in later bought stock at a price reflecting the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective. If a corporation is
started with a promise to pay half of the profits to the employees rather
than the equity investors, that too is simply a term of the contract. It
will be an experiment. We might not expect the experiment to succeed, but such expectations by strangers to the bargain are no objection. Similarly, if a bank is formed with a declared purpose to prefer
loans to minority-owned businesses, or to third-world nations, that is a
matter for the venturers to settle among themselves. So too if a corporation, on building a plant, undertakes never to leave the community.
Corporate ventures may select their preferred "constituencies."
The one thing on which a contractual framework focuses attention
is surprise. If the venture at its formation is designed in the ordinary
fashion-employees and debt investors holding rights to fixed payoffs
and equity investors holding a residual claim to profits, which the other
participants promise to maximize-that is a binding promise. If the
firm suddenly acquires a newspaper and declares that it is no longer
interested in profit, the equity investors have a legitimate complaint. It
is a complaint for breach of contract, not for derogation from some
ethereal ideal of corporate governance.
The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is to adopt a background term that prevails unless varied by contract. And the background term should be the one that is either picked by contract
expressly when people get around to it or is the operational assumption
of successful firms. For most firms the expectation is that the residual
riskbearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits
of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock. Other
participants contract for fixed payouts-monthly interest, salaries, pensions, severance payments, and the like. This allocation of rights
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among the holders of fixed and variable claims serves an economic
function. Riskbearers get a residual claim to profit; those who do not
bear risk on the margin get fixed terms of trade.
One thing that cannot survive is a systematic effort to fool participants. If investments are attracted on the promise of efforts to maximize profits, then that plan must be executed; otherwise new money
cannot be raised and the firm will fail. If investors should come to
doubt the worth of promises made to them, investment in the economy
as a whole would fall. Similarly, if a firm building a new plant undertakes to operate it only as long as it is profitable and then to lay off the
employees and move away, an effort to change the terms later on (if the
feared condition materializes) to lock the plant in place or compel severance payments would be a breach of the agreement. Fear of such
opportunistic conduct ex post would reduce the willingness of investors
to put up new plants and hire new workers.
Notice that a contractual approach does not draw a sharp line between employees and contributors of capital. Employees may be investors in the sense that portions of their human capital are firm-specificthat is, adapted to the corporation's business and worth less in another
job. Holding firm-specific human capital is a way of investing in the
firm. The question is not whether employees and other "constituencies" of the firm have entitlements or expectations-they do-but what
those entitlements are. If employees negotiate for or accept a system of
severance payments to protect their firm-specific human capital, they
cannot turn around later and demand an additional device (such as a
contract for a term of years) when business goes bad. Each investor
must live with the structure of risks built into the firm. Equity claimants
lose out to debt claimants when times are bad and are not thereby entitled to some additional compensation. It is all a matter of enforcing the
contracts. And for any employee or investor other than the residual
claimant, that means the explicit, negotiated contract.
The choice of maximand is still important if political society wishes
to change corporate behavior. Given wealth as a maximand, society
may change corporate conduct by imposing monetary penalties. These
reduce the venturers' wealth, so managers will attempt to avoid them.
So. for example, a pollution tax would induce the firm to emit less. It
would behave as if it had the interests of others at heart. Society thus
takes advantage of the wealth-maximizing incentives built into the firm
in order to alter its behavior at least cost. Nothing in our approach asks
whether political society should attempt to make firms behave as if they
have the welfare of nonparticipants in mind. We do not address optimal ways to deal with pollution, bribery, plant closings, and other decisions that have effects on people who may not participate in the
corporate contract. Society must choose whether to conscript the
firm's strength (its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing the prices
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it confronts, or by changing its structure so that it is less apt to maximize wealth. The latter choice will yield less of both good ends than
the former.
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